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ARGUMENT 
RFPI V 1PI HIM11 MR. OSEN NEED NOT MARSHAL THE FACTS IN THE RECORD 
BECAUSE HIS APPEAL CONCERNING THE COURT'S 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REQUIRES NO MARSHALING AND HIS 
ATTACK ON FINDING 22 IS BASED UPON THE TRIAL COURT'S 
TMPPOPFR APPT TP ATTOTsJ OF THF T AW. 
Iii lici r »• N*- .^ -i'giies that Mi. U&cu & appeal from ''the court's findings" 
requires that he marshal all of the tacts in the record that support those findings. 
It is generally Intc ||||,i|1111 " \yyv\i\ f'!""1 ' " '"ml'm's "'f ,n I*IH( ""'I* i^fi'lliini 
doctrine is not applicable because Mr. Osen's appeal is based upon the pi ©position that the trial 
H 'inl1'. hiii lilies JO .iiiiiii Il ," " and sivveuil I ili jmelusions were based upon the improper 
ripplication of establi'ihed legal principles. Thus, as dr eussed in Reply Point B, mj'ra, Finding 
JO is founded upon the court's failure to properly apply Hi Al I ("ODE ANN. §30-3-5(7) which 
i equii es that the standard of living of the parties be determined at the time of separatioi i :>:i at tl i€ 
t i m e o f trial M r . Osen,. c o n c e d e s t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f h i s i n c o m e at an a l t e r n a t i v e 
riatr ( | 0 0 7 | i, >iiip|inili nil I < mil mv IIIIIII line i i u i n l llliiiiiiil IIII i>in Midi in mi IIIIIII illni I illiin llliiii 
t i m e f r a m e a p p l i e d b y t h e court: t \ as ii i lpi oper. 
court to base alimony upon in i ;:  c: in i me at the time of trial and expenses determined to be reasonable 
in Finding 20 If, as a matter" of law this court detei mines that the trial court could disregard its 
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own findings as to expenses, Mr. Osen concedes that there is evidence in the record which could 
support the alimony award. 
Finally, Mr. Osen's attack on conclusions of the court concerning the awarding of the 
marital home to Mrs. Osen is based upon the argument that the court used an improper 
calculation of the disposable income of the parties and that the court's conclusion lacks legal 
precedence or supporting evidence that Mr. Osen had an obligation to retroactively pay interim 
alimony which had never been awarded. In short, this appeal is based upon the trial court's 
misapplication of legal principles and a "finding" (relating to retroactive alimony) for which no 
supporting evidence can be marshalled in the record. Mrs. Osen's marshalling argument must 
therefore be rejected. 
REPLY POINT B: THE EVIDENCE OF MR. OSEN'S INCOME AS OF THE DATE OF 
THE TRIAL WAS UNDISPUTED. 
In his initial brief Mr. Osen argued that the trial court erred in basing the computation of 
his alimony obligation on his 1997 income, rather than his income at the time of trial (August 
1998). In her brief Mrs. Osen responds that the alimony determination should have been based 
upon Mr. Osen's income at the time of separation (March 1996) (R.28), not the date of trial and 
that there is sufficient evidence in the record to justify the trial court's ruling. Mr. Osen 
concedes that there is evidence in the record supporting the court's finding that Mr. Osen's 
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income in 1997 was $3,083 per month l rru~ : isi ic presented by Mrs, Osen's argument is 
iivlifllii11! ilh<" iii nil ir rill lid In ivf hj-ised its al" 
(hr lime of separation (1996) or al the time of trial (1998). 
1,1 • I N ' . " •' 
(a) rhe court shall consider at the least the following factors in determining 
alim.oii)/ : 
(i) The financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, 
(ii) The recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii)The ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv)The length of the marriage. . 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living existing, at 
the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with 
subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard 
of living that existed at the time of trial . 
The court may, under appropriate circumstances, atlempl lo equiih/r I lie 
parties' respective standards of living. 
(Emphasis added.) 
II I i i iiillii I. Il I in II i in 11 s i i i i ^ i s i s 1 v \ u i i l h ' i i i i i l i 1 (iiiiiiiii 'i II mi i l l I i I il  II 111 ill i i j11 lllliii s t . i i i i i l i i i l Il  III1 in i in i Il 
the parties: the date of sepai ation (the preferred time) or the time of trial In this case the trial 
I iiiiiiiiiill I I  in s i du III, i I  lilllin expense need- nil III IUIIICS us nil llii dak uf liulll ( h i idi t igs III11 ciiiitl JU 
1
 Mr. Osen's wages for all of 1997 were $30,375, or $2,531.25 per month (Exhibit 23.) However, he testified that 
his wages had been reduced in 1997 to $2. 500 per month. (R 196.) The difference between his wages and his 
total income of $33,672 was due to interest income ($1,237), capital gains from the sale of a small interest in a 
business ($1,202) and income from an investment ($858). (Exhibit 23.) There is no evidence as to whether any of 
the non-wage income was recurring. Mr Osen concedes that income from his investment will continue at the rate 
of $858 per year. 
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Exhibits 13 and 25) and Mrs. Osen's income as of the date of trial (Finding 19; Exhibit 14), but 
used Mr. Osen's income for 1997 in setting alimony (Finding 20; Exhibits 23 and 24). 
The only evidence presented to the court concerning Mr. Osen's income in March 1996 
(date of separation), is the following testimony given by Mr. Osen in response to cross-
examination by Mrs. Osen's counsel: 
Q You had a steady increase in pay through the past years, haven't you? 
A No, I have not. 
Q I show you Interrogatory No. 4 where it talks about it. Does it say in '95 
you had $32,400, $33,650 in '96, and $33,750 in '97? 
A Yes. Those three years. 
(R.259.) Thus, the only evidence before the court as to Mr. Osen's income in 1996, the 
year of separation, was $33,650, or $2,804 per month. 
Nowhere in his Findings or oral ruling does the trial judge explain why he chose to base 
Mr. Osen's alimony obligation on 1997 income, including income which was not recurring, 
instead of separation or trial year income. 
Recognizing that the court's Finding is flawed, Mrs. Osen attempts to rehabilitate the 
court's decision by offering two explanations for reliance on 1997 income. (1) Mr. Osen 
persuaded his employer to reduce his income as a means of reducing his alimony and (2) Mr. 
Osen's reduction in 1997 income was not permanent. (See Brief of Appellee at p. 11.) 
Mrs. Osen's attempt to justify the Finding 20 is a tacit admission of the inadequacies of 
that Finding. More to the point, however, there is no indication in the record that Mr. Osen's 
4 
reduction in income was voluntary or temporary. Significantly, the court entered no findings on 
those issues. 
The court should have chosen the date of trial as the benchmark for determining Mr. 
Osen's income for a number of reasons: (a) living expenses were determined as of the date of 
trial; (b) Mrs. Osen's income was determined as of that date; (c) Mr. Osen had experienced a 
significant cut in income in 1997; and (c) Mr. Osen's income for 1997 included at least one 
addition (capital gains on the sale of an asset) and perhaps another (interest) which were not 
recurring expenses. 
It was an abuse of discretion for the court to have considered the 1997 income as the 
factor on which alimony was based. This court should remand the case to the trial court with 
instructions to base its alimony award upon Mr. Osen's income at the time of trial or separation. 
REPLY POINT C: THE REWARD OF ALIMONY WAS BASED UPON AN IMPROPER 
COMPUTATION OF INCOME AND EXPENSES. 
As noted in Reply Point B, the trial court disregarded UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5(7) in 
attributing income to Mr. Osen for the purpose of computing alimony. If Mr. Osen's income at 
the time of trial, rather than his 1997 income, is used, the reduction is $515 per month. 
Mrs. Osen argues at page 12 of the Brief of Appellee that the court's alimony award is 
justified by the disparity between the "disposable income" of the parties.2 It is true that the trial 
court found that Mr. Osen's disposable income was $2,096.90 per month while that of Mrs. Osen 
2
 By disposable income the court means the difference between gross income and taxes plus living expenses. 
Findings 20, 22. 
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was $171.40. (Finding 22.) However, that computation is based upon two erroneous 
assumptions by the trial court: first, that Mr. Osen's income was $3,083 per month. In reality, 
as discussed above, his income at the time of trial was $2,568 per month and his income at the 
time of separation was $2,804. Thus, the trial court's assumption was erroneous by either $515 
or $279 per month. Second, the court disregarded its own Finding 20 in computing Mr. Osen's 
disposable income. In Finding 20 the court found that Mr. Osen's "reasonable monthly 
expenses" totaled $2,230.10. Thus, the court found that Mr. Osen's disposable income was 
$852.90 per month ($3,083.00 - $2,230.10 = $852.90). Inexplicably, in computing alimony the 
court disregarded its own finding and stated that for the purpose of that determination it would 
disregard some of the expenses it had approved in Finding 20 and would attribute disposable 
income of $2,096.90 per month. The court justified that slight-of-hand by explaining that Mr. 
Osen had not actually paid some of the living expenses in the list of monthly expenses which the 
court had acknowledged as being reasonable in Finding 20: 
The parties have been separated approximately 29 months. During that time 
period the Respondent has not paid rent, utilities, property taxes or insurance and 
his motorcycle payment was $156 instead of his projected car payment of $255. 
If the court were to make these changes to the expenses set forth in the preceding 
paragraph, Respondent would have disposable income of $2,096.90 per month. ... 
(Finding 22.) 
In essence the court's finding is based upon the proposition that even if a court finds that 
a spouse's living expenses are reasonable, those expenses can be disregarded in computing 
alimony if the assessed spouse does not actually pay them. The flaw in the court's reasoning is 
that it fails to account for the fact that alimony is intended to equalize the parties' standard of 
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living. In this case the undisputed evidence was that Mr. Osen was living on a temporary basis 
with his boss as a cost-saving measure. The court correctly determined that when he moved into 
his own apartment it would cost him $525 per month for rent (Finding 20). 
The purpose of alimony is to equalize the parties' standard of living. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§30-3-5(7); Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In this case the 
court's Finding 20 acknowledges that to equalize the standard of living of the parties it would be 
necessary to "credit" Mr. Osen with the expense of apartment rent for $525, even if on a 
temporary basis he chooses to live with a friend or, for that matter, in a cardboard box under a 
freeway overpass. But if a party does not choose to live at a level similar to that enjoyed during 
marriage, his or her decision should not adversely affect alimony. 
This precise issue was considered in Howell v. Howell, supra, where the court stated: 
We disagree, however, that standard of living is determined by actual expenses 
alone. Those expenses may be necessarily lower than needed to maintain an 
appropriate standard of living for various reasons, including, possibly, lack of 
income. 
Id. The above rule is logical: if alimony were based only upon actual expenses, there would be 
no incentive for the payor spouse to economize in, say, housing or transportation. In addition, a 
contrary rule would disregard the policy of the law to equalize the parties' standards of living, not 
merely expenditures measured by living expenses adjusted by payment of alimony. 
In this case the trial court found that Mr. Osen's living expenses of $2,230 per month were 
reasonable. That finding should have been followed in the computation of alimony. If the court 
had followed its own finding, Mr. Osen's disposable income would have been $338 per month, 
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not the $2,096.90 per month disposable income posited by the court in Finding 22. By its own 
computation, therefore, the trial court's computation of alimony was clearly erroneous. 
REPLY POINT D: THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT COMPENSATING FACTOR 
JUSTIFYING AN UNEQUAL DIVISION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
The trial court awarded marital assets worth $206,508 to Mrs. Osen and assets worth 
$145,554 to Mr. Osen. (Decree, ffl| 3-5; Conclusion 5.) The main source of the disparity was the 
awarding to Mrs. Osen of the marital residence ("Dry Fork Property") having a value of $91,500. 
In his initial brief Mr. Osen argued that the inequitable division was based upon factors which, as 
a matter of law, should not have been considered by the trial court. These included an offset 
against improperly computed prospective alimony and the imposition of retroactive interim 
alimony. In her brief Respondent argues the trial court was not required to divide the marital 
estate equally, that the Dry Fork Property had special significance to Respondent and that Mr. 
Osen received compensation for the inequitable division in the form of a reduction of his 
alimony obligation. None of the explanations offered by Mrs. Osen for the inequitable division 
of the marital estate justifies the court's property division. 
1. The Trial Court Offered No Legally Sufficient Basis Supporting an Unequal 
Division of the Property. 
As a general proposition each party to a divorce is presumed to be entitled to one-half of 
the marital property. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The court may, however, choose to award one of the 
3
 Even if the trial court's use of the 1997 income is used, disposable income is $852.90 ($3,083.00 - $2,230.90). 
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parties more than half of the marital estate, if there is a "significant compensating factor" 
justifying the uneven treatment. Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1982). See 
also Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d at 1022. ("[0]nce a court makes a finding that a specific item is 
marital property, the law presumes that it will be shared equally between the parties unless 
unusual circumstances, memorialized in adequate findings, require otherwise.") In this case 
there were no significant compensating factors or unusual circumstances. The equal division 
rule should therefore have been followed. 
2. The Court Did Not Compensate Mr. Osen for the Award of the Dry Fork Property 
to Mrs. Osen by Decreasing His Alimony Obligation. 
The court identified the compensating factors justifying an inequitable division of the 
marital estate in Conclusion 7. There the court stated: 
[T]he difference in value of the assets awarded to the parties will be balanced and 
offset by the amount the court awards as alimony, the nonpayment of alimony or 
other support by Respondent to the Petitioner during the 29 month separation ... 
and the manner in which the court allocated expenses by giving the Respondent 
credit for expenses that he has not actually incurred. 
As discussed in Reply Point C, above, the court's computation of alimony was improper. 
Therefore, the alleged offset against prospective alimony was also improper.4 
As to the court's assertion that there was "nonpayment of alimony or other support" prior 
to trial, there was no finding supporting that statement and, more importantly, there was no 
4
 There is irony in the court's statement that it had given "the Respondent credit for the expenses that he had not 
actually incurred." Although the court found in Finding 20 that the enumerated expenses were reasonable, it 
specifically declined to take those expenses into account in Finding 22 in the computation of "disposable income." 
Thus Mr. Osen received de jure acknowledgement of reasonableness in Finding 20 but a de facto rejection of those 
same expenses in the computation of alimony found in Finding 22. In point of fact the court did not give Mr. Osen 
credit for expenses in a way which reduced his alimony. 
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evidence adduced as to payment or nonpayment of interim alimony. (Indeed, Mrs. Osen is 
noticeably silent in directing the court's attention to a shred of evidence supporting the court's 
statement.) 
Thus, the court's justification for the unequal division of the marital estate is legally 
insufficient. 
3. Mrs. Osen's Sentimental Attachment to the House Does Not Justify the Awarding 
of the House to Her Without a Compensating Award to Mr. Osen. 
Mrs. Osen argues at page 15 of the Brief of Appellee that it was equitable for the court to 
have awarded her the Dry Fork Property because "the home was [Mrs. Osen's] grandmother's 
and is located on the family ranch . . ." In support of that proposition Mrs. Osen cites the case of 
Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In that case this court upheld the trial court's 
award of the marital home to the husband based, in part, upon the fact that he had owned the 
home for many years before the marriage, that he had raised all nine of his children by his earlier 
marriage in the home, that a distribution to his wife in the divorce would require him to sell the 
house and that his wife's financial contribution to remodeling of the house was disproportionate 
to the equity. Id at 1270. 
It is unclear from the decision to what extent the fact that the house had "special 
meaning" to the husband was viewed by this court as justifying the award of the house to him. It 
is also unclear whether the wife was compensated for the funds she had contributed towards 
remodeling of the home. In any event, the facts in Cox, are distinguishable from those in this 
case. In Cox the husband had lived in the home for 20 years prior to the marriage; he had raised 
a family in the home; he had paid off the mortgage and his marriage to the plaintiff had been of 
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short duration. By contrast, in this case the parties moved into the home before they were 
married and spent considerable joint effort and finances in both purchasing and remodeling it and 
they have lived in the home for almost fifteen years. 
That Mrs. Osen has sentimental attachment to the home because it had once belonged to 
her grandparents should not be a factor upon which the award of the home is based. Nearly 
every party to a divorce has a sentimental attachment to the marital home. Often such homes are 
acquired from parents or relatives. To base the award of the home on such sentiments would be 
to place the trial court in the business of trying to determine whose sentimental attachment runs 
deeper. The trial court did not recite Mrs. Osen's feelings towards the house or the house's 
history as a basis for the conclusion that the home should be awarded to her. This court should 
also refrain from doing so. 
The trial court's award of the home to Mrs. Osen without a compensating award to Mr. 
Osen violates the rule that a property division should be equal absent "significant compensating 
factors". This court should therefore reverse the trial court's decision relating to property 
division and remand with the instruction that Mr. Osen be awarded one-half the equity in the 
home or property of like value. 
REPLY POINT E: MR. OSEN IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM APPEALING THE TRIAL 
COURT'S AWARD OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. 
Without receiving any evidence as to value the trial court awarded Mrs. Osen certain 
items of personal property which she held at the time of the separation of the parties. In his 
initial brief Mr. Osen argued that the award of that personal property was improper because it 
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was not based upon any finding as to value or any other factor which would justify the court's 
award. (Indeed, this precise problem was pointed out to the trial court by an objection to the 
Decree and to the corresponding conclusion (Conclusion 5) before the Decree was entered.) 
After entry of the Decree Mr. Osen moved for a new trial on the limited issue of the division of 
the personal property in question. Later, he withdrew his motion for a new trial once he had 
decided to appeal the trial court's decision. 
Mrs. Osen argues in Point IV of her Brief that by withdrawing his motion for a new trial 
Mr. Osen is estopped from prosecuting this appeal. Mrs. Osen offers no authority for her 
argument. Indeed, it seems unlikely that any can be found. The doctrine of estoppel requires 
"conduct by one party which leads another party in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action 
resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct." Perkins 
v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 1125, 1129-30 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). It is hard to 
imagine that Mrs. Osen adopted a course of action resulting in detriment or damage to her 
because of Mr. Osen's motion for a new trial or his withdrawal of that motion. Certainly there is 
no evidence of that fact in the record. 
As a final matter on this point, Mrs. Osen argues that at the time of separation Mr. Osen 
took certain items of personal property from the Dry Fork Property. (R.47.) That fact provides 
no support for the court's award. Parties often divide property on an interim basis in a manner 
which reflects the inability of the leaving spouse to take care of large quantities of goods. 
Moreover interim property division awards are not dispositive as to ultimate division of the 
marital estate. The court entered no finding whatsoever by which it explained the reason for the 
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award. Because there was no finding and no evidence supporting the court's award, the decision 
of the trial court should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions that the court take 
further evidence as to the awarding of the personal property or that the award be stricken from 
the Decree. 
REPLY POINT F: MR. OSEN SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS INCURRED IN PURSUING THIS APPEAL. 
Mr. Osen hereby requests that the court award him his attorney fees and court costs 
incurred in pursuing this appeal. Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
(In a domestic action attorney fees may be awarded to the party who substantially prevails on 
appeal.) 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court in this case failed to apply well-recognized legal principles in the awarding of 
alimony. In particular, the court failed correctly to determine Mr. Osen's income and failed to 
deduct from his income his reasonable living expenses in computing the "disposable income" which 
would be available for payment of alimony. In addition, the trial court failed to equally divide the 
marital home or to explain the reason for its failure to award Mr. Osen his one-half equity in the 
home or a reasonable equivalent. The court's rulings involve an abuse of discretion which require a 
reversal of the Decree with instructions to the trial court that alimony be either eliminated or revised 
and that Mr. Osen be awarded a one-half interest or its equivalent in the Dry Fork Property. The 
court should reverse the award of the personal property retained by Mrs. Osen and direct that it 
be stricken from the Decree. 
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DATED this \l«! day of July, 1999. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
StevenlirGunn 
Attorney for Appellant 
484803/shg 
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